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ABSTRACT 
  In Marsingill v. O’Malley, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the 
physician’s duty to disclose extends to situations in which a physician has not 
had an opportunity to examine a patient. This Comment argues that 
extending the physician’s duty to disclose in this way places an unreasonable 
burden on physicians and that the Alaska Supreme Court was not justified in 
imposing this duty under the Marsingill facts. Further, the supreme court’s 
rationale for choosing the reasonable patient standard over the reasonably 
prudent physician standard may be outdated. The reasonable patient standard 
is based on a fallacy of medical paternalism, is tainted by hindsight bias, and 
causes physicians to respond negatively in a manner that harms patients. 
Without legislative intervention, physicians will be forced to inconvenience 
patients or assume an unreasonable risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following legal practice scenario: One evening after 
work, you get a call from a client concerning a document she has just 
received regarding a matter for which you provided legal service. She 
provides little detail about the contents of the document, and she asks 
your advice. You point out the obvious: you cannot give her advice 
without having an opportunity to evaluate the document and you ask to 
see it. Your client apologizes for the late call and says she’ll take a look 
at it again and get back to you but only if she thinks it needs your 
attention. 
The next you hear from your client is when you are served with a 
complaint alleging that you have committed professional malpractice by 
failing to provide her with enough information to make an intelligent 
decision regarding her need for legal advice. 
Now consider this lawyer-client hypothetical in the context of the 
physician-patient relationship. After Marsingill v. O’Malley,1 a physician 
has a duty to disclose the material facts for her patient’s decision about 
whether to seek professional services regardless of the physician’s 
opportunity to evaluate the patient.2 If the patient makes known to the 
physician that she has decided not to seek the physician’s services, the 
 
 1. Marsingill v. O’Malley (Marsingill II), 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006); 
Marsingill v. O’Malley (Marsingill I), 58 P.3d 495 (Alaska 2002). Marsingill was 
twice appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 2. See Marsingill II, 128 P.3d at 162. 
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physician has a duty to disclose the potential consequences of that 
decision. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the physician 
provided sufficient information for the patient to make an informed 
decision about her need to seek the physician’s services.3 
Applying the duties of physicians in their relationships with 
patients after Marsingill to those of the lawyer in our hypothetical would 
require the lawyer to speculate about the contents of the unseen 
document, provide legal advice to the client without knowledge of its 
contents, and advise her of the consequences should the client fail to 
seek further counsel on the matter. Whether our lawyer provided 
sufficient information including material risks for an informed client 
decision will be for the trier of fact to determine.4 
This Comment considers the doctrine of informed consent and 
more specifically the duty to disclose as it applies to physicians’ care in 
Alaska following Marsingill v. O’Malley. Part I discusses the duty to 
disclose and informed consent law in Alaska prior to Marsingill. Part II 
begins with an explanation of the process by which physicians conduct 
patient evaluations. The balance of Part II discusses the procedural 
history of Marsingill and considers the Marsingill court’s discussion of 
the duty to disclose and the standard to be used by a jury in assessing 
the adequacy of a physician’s disclosure. Part III first considers the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s discussion of the factors governing the duty to 
disclose and its selection of the “reasonable patient” standard. Part III 
then explores physician responses to the decision in Marsingill I and the 
implication of those responses for patient care. Part IV briefly discusses 
post-Marsingill case law and concludes with some final thoughts on this 
unique case. 
I.  THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE AND INFORMED CONSENT IN ALASKA 
PRE-MARSINGILL 
The central case in modern informed consent jurisprudence is 
Canterbury v. Spence.5 In Canterbury, the surgeon characterized a 
scheduled spine operation to the patient’s mother as “no more serious 
than any other operation” and failed to reveal that there was a 1% risk of 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 503 (quoting Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 
1149 (Alaska 1993)) (holding that material risks are risks that a physician knows 
or should know a reasonable person would likely consider significant to her 
decision). 
 5. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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paralysis attendant with the procedure.6 The patient developed paralysis 
and eventually filed suit.7 The Canterbury decision established the 
framework for Alaska’s subsequent jurisprudence and stands for five 
propositions. 
First, the fundamental right that every mentally competent adult 
patient decides the course of her own medical treatment requires 
physicians to obtain the patient’s informed consent prior to performing 
treatments or procedures that have risks a patient would consider in 
deciding whether to undergo the treatment or procedure.8 Second, the 
scope of disclosure is shaped by the patient’s material informational 
needs to make an informed decision, not medical custom.9 Third, the 
content of the disclosure is determined by what the physician knows or 
should know to be the informational needs of an ordinary, reasonable 
person in the patient’s position.10 Fourth, there is no need to disclose 
risks which are already known to the patient such as the inherent risk of 
infection complicating surgery, risks of which persons of average 
sophistication are aware, or risks which are immaterial to the decision of 
whether to undergo the treatment.11 Fifth, in failure to disclose cases, 
causality is determined objectively based on what an ordinarily prudent 
person in the patient’s position would have decided if properly 
informed of all significant risks that are known or should be known by 
her physician.12 
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered informed consent in the 
1975 case Poulin v. Zartman.13 In Poulin, the discussion focused on the 
 
 6. Id. at 776–79. The patient was never advised of the risk and his mother 
actually signed the consent after surgery. The surgeon justified his non-
disclosure to the patient maintaining that revealing the risk might deter his 
patient from undergoing needed surgery and that disclosure might produce 
adverse psychological reactions which could preclude the success of the 
operation. Id. 
 7. Id. at 778. 
 8. Id. at 780–83. 
 9. Id. at 786. 
 10. Id. at 787. 
 11. Id. at 788. Two additional exceptions to the rule of disclosure are the 
“emergency exception,” where the harm from failure to treat is imminent and 
the patient is unable to give consent because of unconsciousness or incapacity, 
no relative is available to give consent, and the harm posed by no treatment 
outweighs any harm posed by the treatment, and the “therapeutic exception,” 
where disclosure poses such harm to the physical or mental well-being of the 
patient that it may foreclose a rational decision, complicate or hinder treatment, 
or cause psychological damage to the patient. Id. at 788–89. 
 12. Id. at 791. 
 13. 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975) (overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Alex, 646 P.2d 203 (Alaska 1982)). In one earlier case, Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 
453, 458 (Alaska 1964), the supreme court limited its analysis of informed 
3--HUTCHINSON__FINAL2.DOC 12/11/2008 2:52:38 PM 
2008 MARSINGILL v. O’MALLEY 245 
Canterbury principle: there must be a demonstrated causal link between 
the breach of the duty to disclose and the patient’s treatment choice in 
order to recover for “lack of informed consent.”14 
In Poulin, the plaintiff’s daughter was born premature and required 
the administration of high oxygen concentrations.15 The child survived 
but was disabled and blinded by a condition called retrolental 
fibroplasia (RLF).16 Poulin alleged, inter alia, a breach of the duty to 
disclose the availability of an alternative method of oxygen therapy for 
treatment of his child’s respiratory distress that would have lowered her 
risk of sustaining RLF.17 Omission of this disclosure was material 
because the alternative method of administration reportedly reduced the 
risk of RLF.18 
The supreme court did not reach the “difficult and complex” 
question of the scope of disclosure because the record failed to 
document that, had Poulin known about the alternative, he would have 
declined the oxygen administration employed by Dr. Zartman.19 
Therefore, no causal link between the failure to disclose and the 
treatment chosen was established.20 
The next year, the Alaska Legislature codified portions of the 
common law doctrine of informed consent in section 09.55.556 of the 
Alaska Statutes.21 The statute established three requirements. First, to 
avoid liability, a health care provider must disclose the common risks 
and reasonable alternatives to proposed treatments or procedures.22 
Second, a claimant has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the provider failed to make the required disclosure and, but for the 
failure to disclose, the claimant would not have consented to the 
 
consent to what risks the physician must disclose and concluded that “good 
law” stood for the proposition that a physician need not detail all of the hazards 
of an operation and that physicians retain discretion to tailor the revealed details 
to avoid “unnecessary anxiety and apprehension” on the part of the patient. 
 14. See Patrick, 391 P.2d at 458 (holding that plaintiff must establish that, but 
for the physician’s failure to disclose, the patient would have chosen the 
undisclosed treatment or course of care over the course of care that was chosen). 
 15. Poulin, 542 P.2d at 256. 
 16. Id. RLF is an eye condition that causes blindness. One cause of RLF is 
administration of high concentrations of oxygen to newborns. Id. 
 17. Id. at 255–58. 
 18. Id. at 275. The alternative method is called “titration.” Id. 
 19. Id.; cf. Patrick, 391 P.2d at 458 (finding no causal link between physician’s 
failure to disclose risks of procedure and patient’s decision to undergo 
procedure). 
 20. Poulin, 542 P.2d at 275. 
 21. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (2006). 
 22. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556(a) (2006). 
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proposed treatment or procedure.23 Third, the statute spells out certain 
available defenses to the failure to obtain informed consent: (1) the risk 
not disclosed is too commonly known or too remote to require 
disclosure, (2) the patient stated to the provider that regardless of the 
risk of the proposed treatment or procedure, she would undergo it and 
did not want to be informed, (3) consent by or on behalf of the patient 
was impossible, and (4) the therapeutic exception, where the health care 
provider reasonably believed that full disclosure would have a 
substantially adverse effect on the patient’s condition.24 Notably absent 
is any delineation of the standard by which the adequacy of disclosure 
will be measured. 
In the 1993 case Korman v. Mallin,25 the Alaska Supreme Court took 
on the issue it side-stepped in Poulin: the scope of disclosure required by 
the doctrine of informed consent.26 In Korman, the plaintiff alleged 
medical negligence and lack of informed consent following a reduction 
mammoplasty procedure27 which resulted in “broad, wide, and painful” 
scars.28 Reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. 
Mallin, the Alaska Supreme Court remanded for trial, noting the 
absence of a statutory standard to judge the adequacy of disclosure and 
adopting what it called the “modern view”: the reasonable patient 
standard espoused by Canterbury and other state courts.29 In explaining 
its holding, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on its understanding of the 
physician-patient relationship: “The physician-patient relationship is 
one of trust. . . . A physician therefore undertakes, not only to treat a 
patient physically, but also to respond fully to a patient’s inquiry about 
his treatment, i.e., to tell the patient everything that a reasonable person 
would want to know about the treatment.”30 
Under the reasonable patient standard, the physician must disclose 
risks which are material to a reasonable patient’s decision regarding 
treatment.31 The court described the two-step process of determining 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.556(b)1–4 (2006). 
 25. 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1993). 
 26. Id. at 1146. 
 27. Reduction mammoplasty is a surgical procedure in which the size of 
large breasts is reduced by excision of the excess tissue. 
 28. Korman, 858 P.2d at 1148. 
 29. Id. at 1148–49, 1151; see also Hondroulis v. Schuhmaker, 553 So.2d 398, 
412 (La. 1988). 
 30. Korman, 858 P.2d at 1149 (quoting Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 909 
(Alaska 1991)). 
 31. Id. (citing Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 411); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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materiality under the reasonable patient standard.32 First, some expert 
testimony is necessary because only a qualified expert can judge what 
risks exist and the probability of their occurrence.33 Second, the trier of 
fact must decide whether the probability of that harm occurring is a risk 
which a reasonable person would contemplate when deciding on 
treatment.34 Expert testimony is not required for the second step of the 
process.35 
The Korman court discussed situations when a physician did not 
have to disclose the harm under the circumstances outlined in 
Canterbury.36 The court described the right to exclude risks that are so 
obvious as to “justify presumption of such knowledge.”37 Although the 
Korman court determined that Dr. Mallin satisfied his obligation to 
disclose inherent risks in the procedure, the supreme court decided that 
summary judgment was improvidently granted because the record was 
silent on whether the disclosure included the likelihood of painful, 
unsightly scarring or the increased risk of such scarring because Korman 
was a tobacco smoker.38 
In summary, Korman set the standard for breach of the duty to 
disclose as the reasonable patient standard described in Canterbury. The 
rationale for imposing this “modern view” is in part based on the 
principle of respect for personal autonomy. It is also founded on the 
fiduciary-like nature of the physician-patient relationship, where the 
patient’s reliance on the physician for health and treatment creates a 




 32. Korman, 858 P.2d at 1149. 
 33. Id. (citing Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 412). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1149–50 (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788–89). 
 37. Korman, 858 P.2d at 1150 (citing Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022–23 
(Md. 1977)). 
 38. Id. at 1147, 1150–51. Korman maintained that Dr. Mallin had not 
explained to her that her tobacco smoking would increase her risk of scarring. 
Korman admitted to reading in the surgery consent form that she signed that all 
complications of which she had been advised of verbally or in writing were 
increased by 50% because she smoked. Id. 
 39. See Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 909 (Alaska 1991). 
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II.  UNRAVELING MARSINGILL 
A. Medical Decision Making or Evaluation40 
A physician’s typical approach to a patient begins with soliciting 
the patient’s history and conducting a physical examination. The length 
of the history and the comprehensiveness of the physical examination 
vary depending upon the acuity, severity, and complexity of the 
patient’s illness. At the conclusion of this initial process, a differential 
diagnosis is formulated. The differential diagnosis is a compilation, 
usually unwritten at this stage of an evaluation, of the disease entities 
that should be considered given the patient’s history and the findings of 
the physical examination. Often, additional diagnostic procedures like 
laboratory tests and x-rays help narrow the differential diagnosis by 
eliminating some possibilities. 
Treatment recommendations typically follow this evaluative process 
except where, by virtue of historical specificity, evaluation and diagnosis 
can be made based on history alone. However, when a patient’s 
telephone call presents symptoms and signs that are non-specific or 
numerous and there is no opportunity to perform a physical 
examination, the physician will be unable to perform an adequate 
evaluation over the phone. Any response to inquiry about treatment 
recommendations at this point is speculative and most likely to be 
directed at symptomatic relief rather than definitive therapy.41 Further 
evaluation is necessary to develop a reasonable differential diagnosis. 
Although a condition’s severity and frequency of occurrence play a role 
in prioritizing the differential diagnosis, it would be improper and 
hazardous to exclude possible diagnoses until continued evaluation 
justifies their exclusion.42 
In assessing a patient who has called for advice over the telephone, 
a physician may have nothing more than the patient’s recitation of a few 
non-specific symptoms on which to base the initial evaluation. 
Speculation about various diagnoses is unlikely to be helpful to the 
 
 40. This section is based on the author’s 35 years of clinical practice as a 
physician. The book Medical Decision Making utilizes a similar approach to 
medical decision making and evaluation. See HAL SOX ET AL., MEDICAL DECISION 
MAKING (1988). 
 41. One form of “treatment” at this stage might include aspirin for a high 
fever or for certain forms of pain. 
 42. A common pitfall for the inexperienced practitioner is to seize upon a 
diagnosis that seems most likely or most serious and halt the evaluative process 
at that point. As the evaluation progresses, considering additional history, doing 
a directed or specialized physical examination, or performing additional tests 
may be warranted. Evaluation is most often an ongoing process. 
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patient and may be misleading. All a physician can offer is information 
the patient already knows. Patients may be in the best position to decide 
based on their own personal experience what should be their next 
course of action. 
 
B.  Analysis of Marsingill v. O’Malley 
1. Facts.  In October 1994, Dr. James O’Malley performed surgery 
on Vicki Marsingill to remove staples placed in her stomach by another 
surgeon to facilitate weight loss.43 By January 1995, Marsingill had 
recovered from her October surgery and was able to return to work.44 
During her evening meal on February 14, 1995, Marsingill suffered 
a sudden illness characterized by pain, nausea, and inability to eat.45 Her 
pain worsened over several hours and eventually her daughter called 
Dr. O’Malley on the telephone.46 Dr. O’Malley first spoke with 
Marsingill’s daughter and then to Marsingill herself.47 Marsingill and 
her daughter reported that Marsingill’s symptoms included nausea, 
abdominal distention, pain, inability to burp or pass gas, and that her 
stomach was “hard as a rock.”48 
Dr. O’Malley advised Marsingill that he was unable to evaluate her 
over the phone and “if she felt bad enough to call him at night” she 
should go to the emergency room (ER) for an evaluation.49 Dr. O’Malley 
repeated several times that he could not evaluate her over the phone 
and offered to meet Marsingill at the ER to expedite her admission.50 
When asked what would happen at the ER, Dr. O’Malley informed 
Marsingill that the evaluation would include x-rays and probably 
placement of a nasogastric tube, a device inserted through the nose and 
used to evacuate stomach contents.51 Dr. O’Malley knew that Marsingill, 
based on her experience, strongly disliked these tubes.52 
After several minutes of conversation, Marsingill told Dr. O’Malley 
she was feeling better and, after hanging up the phone, told her 
 
 43. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d 495, 497 (Alaska 2002). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Marsingill II, 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006) (No. 3AN-
95-9909 CI). 
 47. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 497. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; Appellee’s Brief, supra note 46, at 6–7 (testimony of Dr. O’Malley and 
Elizabeth Belgarde, who overheard O’Malley’s half of the conversation). 
 51. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 497. 
 52. Id. at 497–98. 
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daughter she would “tough it out for awhile.”53 Dr. O’Malley’s 
undisputed testimony was that he again told her that “he believed she 
should go to the ER and in any case, if symptoms worsened, she should 
call him again or directly proceed to the ER.”54 Marsingill’s daughter left 
shortly thereafter, believing that Marsingill’s condition did not require 
her to stay.55 
Two to three hours later, Marsingill was found unconscious on the 
floor in respiratory distress. Paramedics took Marsingill to the hospital 
where surgery revealed the presence of an intestinal volvulus56 causing 
intestinal obstruction and vascular compromise of the bowel.57 During 
the night Marsingill suffered a neurological event that left her with brain 
damage characterized by memory loss and partial paralysis.58 
2. Procedural History.  Marsingill filed suit against Dr. O’Malley 
asserting four claims, including breach of informed consent: Marsingill 
alleged that Dr. O’Malley gave her insufficient information during their 
phone conversation to allow her to make an intelligent decision about 
whether to meet him at the ER for an evaluation. The jury found for Dr. 
O’Malley on each of the four claims. Marsingill appealed on the 
informed consent claim.59 Marsingill maintained that the trial court 
applied the wrong standard for deciding whether Dr. O’Malley had 
given her adequate information to make an intelligent decision about 
going to the ER during their telephone conversation. 
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with Marsingill. The court held 
in Marsingill I that the jury should have been instructed to use the 
reasonable patient standard of care, not the trial court’s reasonable 
professional standard of care, to determine whether Dr. O’Malley had 
given Marsingill sufficient information during the phone call to make an 
intelligent decision about seeking further evaluation.60 The court, in its 
analysis, declared that the duty to disclose extends not only to patients 
 
 53. Id. at 498. 
 54. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 46, at 6. 
 55. Id. at 5–6. 
 56. Volvulus is a rare condition in which the intestine abnormally rotates 
inside the abdominal cavity. It may cause obstruction of the bowel, cut off the 
blood supply to the bowel or both. J. E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF 
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER V-103 (1992). 
 57. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 46, at 7. 
 58. Id.; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Marsingill II, 128 P.3d 151 
(Alaska 2006) (No. 3AN-95-9909 CI) (claiming that as the result of her brain 
damage, Marsingill has no memory of the phone call). 
 59. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d 495, 495 (Alaska 2002). Marsingill also appealed the 
claim that O’Malley lacked skill and knowledge in general surgery and as a 
consequence gave her incompetent advice. Id. 
 60. Id. at 505. 
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for whom treatment has been recommended but also to patients who are 
seeking treatment.61 The court considered Dr. O’Malley’s 
recommendation that Marsingill meet him at the ER for an evaluation as 
a recommendation for treatment.62 The court apparently drew this 
conclusion because during the telephone conversation Dr. O’Malley 
speculated that a nasogastric tube, a device often employed to relieve 
symptoms of abdominal distention, would probably be inserted.63 
The trial court’s judgment was vacated and “the case [was 
remanded] for a new trial on Marsingill’s claim for breach of the duty to 
provide enough information to allow her to make an intelligent 
treatment choice.”64 The jury on retrial was to “be instructed to decide 
the claim from the standpoint of a reasonable patient.”65 
At retrial, the jury again found for Dr. O’Malley. Marsingill again 
appealed claiming, inter alia, that the trial court’s jury instruction 
describing the physician’s duty as a duty to provide “material 
information” to enable a reasonable patient to make an informed and 
intelligent decision misstated the law by excluding the word “all” before 
“material.”66 Marsingill also appealed the admission of testimony by Dr. 
O’Malley’s experts concerning the standard of care for disclosures on 
the grounds that “their views were not directly relevant to what a 
reasonable patient would want to know” and that such testimony was 
inadmissible because the physician expert witnesses were not experts on 
what a reasonable patient would want to know.67 
In Marsingill II, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected her contention 
that the word “all” before the word “material” was necessary to define 
the standard.68 The court noted that the term “material information” was 
defined in the jury instructions as including any information that a 
reasonable patient would find significant.69 Accordingly, the court stated 
that “[r]eading the instructions as a whole, then, it seems unlikely that a 
reasonable juror would have concluded that Dr. O’Malley met his duty 
 
 61. Id. at 504. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 497. A nasogastric tube is a soft, hollow tube introduced through 
the patient’s nose and advanced to the stomach. It is frequently used 
diagnostically for x-ray contrast studies in the evaluation of abdominal pain and 
for the purpose of relieving distention of the intestinal tract. 
 64. Id. at 505. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Marsingill II, 128 P.3d 151, 155 (Alaska 2006). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 162. 
 69. Id. 
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to disclose ‘material information’ despite neglecting to disclose matters 
that Marsingill would have deemed to be significant.”70 
The court also observed that under the negligence standard 
governing failure-to-disclose claims, physician expert testimony on the 
amount and kind of information that patients generally want was 
relevant to whether Dr. O’Malley gave Marsingill the information a 
reasonable patient would want to know and to show what a reasonable 
physician is likely to think a patient might want to know.71 The court 
vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded on an issue 
unrelated to informed consent.72 
3. Discussion of the Court’s Analysis on Imposition of the Duty to 
Disclose and on the Relevant Standard to Apply.  The Alaska Supreme Court 
imposed a duty to disclose upon Dr. O’Malley based upon the American 
Medical Association’s (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics (CME) Section 
8.08, the ethical policy governing informed consent drafted by the AMA 
as a source of policy guidance for practicing physicians.73 The court 
observed that because all of the experts and Dr. O’Malley accepted the 
premise that AMA CME Section 8.08 applied in Marsingill’s case, a 
determination of whether Alaska’s Informed Consent Statute74 would 
have independently encompassed the duty to disclose was 
unnecessary.75 Based on this analysis, however, the supreme court and 
Dr. O’Malley and his experts had different understandings of the 
meaning of Section 8.08. 
The supreme court characterized the scope of disclosure mandated 
by AMA CME Section 8.08 as providing that “[t]he patient’s right of self-
decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough 
information to enable an informed choice.”76 But this is only the first 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 159. 
 72. Id. at 164 (remanding for reconsideration of the amount of attorneys’ fees 
awarded). 
 73. See COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8.08 (American Medical Association 
Press 2004) (1847). Although the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has the 
authority to acquit, admonish, censure, or place on probation the accused 
physician or suspend her from AMA membership, unlike a state bar association, 
the AMA is not in a position to take action against a member’s license to practice 
her profession. Only about one third of U.S. physicians hold membership in the 
AMA. Roger Bybee, The Doctors’ Revolt, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, July 1, 2008, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_doctors_revolt. 
 74. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (2006). 
 75. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d 495, 505 (Alaska 2002). 
 76. Id. at 499. 
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sentence of a multi-sentence paragraph, which continues in pertinent 
part: 
The patient should make his or her own determination about 
treatment. The physician’s obligation is to present the medical 
facts accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible 
for the patient’s care and to make recommendations for 
management in accordance with good medical practice. The 
physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make 
choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent 
with good medical practice.77 
When read as a whole, it is apparent the AMA78 is discussing treatment 
and therapeutic situations, both of which, because of the diagnosis 
process discussed in Part II.A, logically follow an evaluation. 
That AMA CME Section 8.08 can be read as covering the broader 
duty to disclose that the court imposed in Marsingill I, namely a duty to 
disclose before a physician has had an opportunity to perform an 
evaluation, is not evident on its face. Furthermore, nothing in the court’s 
language satisfactorily explains why this should be the case. Although 
the court describes as “uncontradicted” the evidence that Dr. O’Malley 
told Marsingill to go to the ER for treatment, the statement of the facts 
indicates Dr. O’Malley urged her to go for an evaluation.79 The court 
apparently fails to distinguish between a recommendation for 
evaluation and one for treatment. 
Finally, perhaps recognizing that AMA CME Section 8.08 is 
intended to apply to treatment recommendations, the court 
mischaracterizes Dr. O’Malley’s recommendation for an evaluation at 
the ER as the equivalent of a treatment recommendation to do nothing 
in the face of threatening symptoms.80 Using the duty to disclose as a 
framework, the court considers Dr. O’Malley’s acquiescence to 
Marsingill’s decision not to seek evaluation as the equivalent of a 
treatment recommendation.81 Ultimately, however, physicians must 
always acquiesce to patients’ decisions about treatment and evaluation 
 
 77. See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 73. 
 78. See also Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 504 (Dr. O’Malley’s understanding is the 
same as the AMA’s, that the “factual predicate for the . . . duty to disclose, i.e., a 
recommended treatment or procedure, is totally absent.”). 
 79. See id. at 497. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 504. 
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or risk doing violence to patient autonomy, protected throughout 
informed consent jurisprudence.82 
With respect to what standard should apply, the court decided that 
the issues of concern in Marsingill were “precisely” the issues that 
Korman describes as within the fact-finding powers that the reasonable 
patient standard leaves to lay jurors.83 On remand, the reasonable 
patient standard governed the breach of duty to disclose claim.84 
Based on Korman, the duty to disclose should be governed by the 
reasonable patient standard in the context of recommendations for 
treatment. Since the court found that under the Marsingill I facts, Dr. 
O’Malley’s recommendation to seek an evaluation at the ER was really a 
recommendation for treatment, the reasonable patient standard should 
apply. Had the court more reasonably found Dr. O’Malley’s 
recommendation to seek evaluation not a “treatment recommendation,” 
it is unknown whether Korman would have been sufficient foundation 
for the court to invoke the duty to disclose.85 The court instead chose a 
new source of law for the duty to disclose, AMA Section 8.08, and 
declared the reasonable patient standard from Alaska common law 
correct.86 
Although courts recently have been reluctant to allow the medical 
profession to set the standard for disclosure out of fear that professional 
protectionism or paternalism would govern the disclosure, there is 
reason to believe that the reasonably prudent physician standard would 
result in the degree of disclosure the courts have contemplated since 
Canterbury. 
III.  CRITIQUE OF MARSINGILL I 
There are two aspects of note to the court’s analysis in Marsingill I: 
(1) the factors a court should consider in resolving the competing 
 
 82. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 
1914) (finding physician civilly liable for perfoming a surgery where the patient 
had consented to an exam under ether anesthesia but testified that she had 
notified her physician, a hospital employee, that there was to be no operation); 
see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 83. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 505. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Alaska 1993); see also Pedersen v. 
Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 909 (Alaska 1991) (holding that physician had a duty to 
disclose the fact that procedures used during patient’s operation were a cause of 
patient’s paralysis). Pedersen, however, addressed a physician’s comments 
regarding an adverse outcome from surgery rather than disclosure in a pre-
treatment scenario. Id. 
 86. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 505. 
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interests relevant to the duty to disclose, and (2) courts’ preferences for 
the reasonable patient standard in this setting. 
Few would disagree that our courts have an obligation to refine 
and develop the common law. Changes in the common law should be 
the result of thorough and careful analysis, thoughtfully revealed in the 
court’s opinion. The court should not confine its discussion to ideas that 
only support its eventual conclusion. The integrity of the courts is 
bolstered when the issues have been thoroughly evaluated and 
discussed. 
A.  The Marsingill Court Was Unjustified in Imposing a Duty to 
Disclose Under the Facts of the Case 
In Korman, the Alaska Supreme Court relied primarily on the 
rationales expressed in Hondroulis and Canterbury.87 The reason for 
imposing the duty accepted by the Alaska Supreme Court is that the 
patient has a right to determine what is done to her body, and this right 
can only be properly exercised when the patient is informed and in a 
position to make an intelligent decision.88 Further, because patients rely 
nearly exclusively on their physicians for information, it is necessary to 
impose the duty to disclose to ensure the patient receives the 
information she needs to make her decision.89 Implicit, but necessary to 
the imposition of the duty under this rationale, is the assumption that 
the physician can advise the patient of the relevant information 
necessary to make an intelligent decision. 
Under the facts of Marsingill, Dr. O’Malley was not in a position to 
exercise his judgment for the benefit of his patient because he had not 
had an opportunity to evaluate Marsingill. After a physician has had an 
opportunity to evaluate her patient, the particularized information 
disparity between the usual patient and her physician is realized and 
warrants the imposition of the duty to disclose. In Canterbury, Dr. 
Spence had evaluated Canterbury’s condition and was prepared to 
render a recommendation of proposed treatment.90 Similarly, in 
Hondroulis, the operating surgeon had an opportunity to evaluate his 
patient’s condition prior to advising surgery.91 This was not so in 
 
 87. See Korman, 858 P.2d at 1149 (quoting Hondroulis v. Schuhmaker, 553 
So.2d 398, 414–15 (La. 1988)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 776–77 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 91. See also Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980) (imposing upon 
physicians the duty to advise patients of the consequences of declining a 
3--HUTCHINSON__FINAL2.DOC 12/11/2008 2:52:38 PM 
256 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 25:2 
Marsingill. Dr. O’Malley was not speaking from the position of a 
physician who had an opportunity to evaluate the patient and advise 
any treatment. The Marsingill court failed to recognize or consider this 
important distinction between Marsingill and the cases it relied upon. 
A second difference is the increased availability of health 
information for patients from sources other than their physicians. 
Physicians are no longer patients’ exclusive source of information, 
which was true at the time of Canterbury, Hondroulis, and Pedersen. As of 
2006, approximately 113 million adults have searched for health 
information and half of those indicated the information they received 
influenced their health care.92 The search engine Google is itself capable 
of diagnosing a number of diseases with accurate data input.93 The time 
when physicians were the sole source of health information has passed. 
While physicians usually know more about disease and treatment than 
patients, until the opportunity to evaluate a patient has been afforded, 
the particularized disclosure necessary to provide the meaningful 
information Canterbury contemplates cannot be delivered. Only when 
the physician possesses specific, meaningful information that the patient 
needs to make an intelligent decision does the rationale of Canterbury 
make sense. 
B.  The Justification for Choosing the “Reasonable Patient” Over 
One of the Professional Standards May No Longer Be Valid 
1.  Medical Paternalism. In Korman, the Alaska Supreme Court 
rejected professional standards for whether the physician had met his 
duty to disclose enough information for a patient to make an informed 
decision.94 Preferring the “modern trend” of case law, the Korman court 
adopted the reasonable patient standard proposed by Canterbury and 
 
recommended procedure, where the physician had an opportunity to evaluate 
the patient). 
 92. See Susannah Fox, Online Health Search 2006 (Pew Internet & Am. Life 
Project, Washington, D.C.), October 29, 2006, at i–iii, available at http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Health_2006.pdf (last visited May 8, 
2007). The 2006 report reveals that 80% of American adult internet users have 
searched for information on at least one of seventeen health topics; every day, 
eight million users search health topics; and approximately one half of 
respondents’ most recent health search sessions had some impact on how they 
care for themselves or others. Id. 
 93. Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Ng, Googling for a Diagnosis—Use of Google As 
a Diagnostic Aid: Internet Based Study, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1143, 1143–45 (2006), 
available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/333/7579/1143 (last visited 
May 10, 2007). 
 94. Korman v. Mallin , 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993). 
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articulated by Hondroulis.95 The court was concerned that both 
professional standards (those of medical custom and the reasonably 
prudent physician) arrogate the judgment of adequate disclosure to 
physicians and fail to adequately protect the patient’s interests.96 
One origin of the concern that physicians might choose not to 
disclose or to disclose inadequately is medical paternalism, identifiable 
within the profession dating to the time of Hippocrates. Hippocrates 
recommended “conceal[ing] most things from the patient while you are 
attending to him . . . reveal[ing] nothing of the patient’s future or present 
condition.”97 Hippocrates believed that a physician’s primary concern 
was the patient’s well-being and that the patient’s well-being was 
threatened by the delivery of bad news.98 Paternalistic behavior was 
appropriate if it contributed to patient well-being. Although the 
rationale of Canterbury is strongly anti-paternalistic, even Canterbury 
permits an exception to disclosure where “risk-disclosure poses such a 
threat of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or 
contraindicated from a medical point of view.”99 
Interestingly, there is empirical evidence that paternalism within 
the medical profession was rapidly waning before the decision in 
Canterbury in 1972. For example, the Hondroulis court cited a 1968 
surgical text that stated, “[a] physician’s standards require him to inform 
the patient of ‘everything pertinent both to his condition and to the 
probable course of his treatment which he is capable of understanding 
intellectually and able to accept emotionally . . .’”100 There were other 
indicia that physicians were embracing the concept that patients should 
be informed fully about their health and care before the decision in 
Canterbury. A 1961 survey revealed the paternalistic position that 90% of 
physicians preferred not to tell cancer patients their diagnoses; by 1976, 
97% of physicians surveyed preferred to disclose a diagnosis of 
cancer.101 This complete transformation in physicians’ attitude towards 
 
 95. Id. (citing Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398, 411 (La. 1989); 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 786–87. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Hippocrates, DECORUM 297 (W. Jones trans., Harvard University Press 
1967). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 
 100. Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 416 (quoting Laufman, Surgical Judgment, in 
CHRISTOPHER’S TEXTBOOK OF SURGERY 1459, 1461 (9th ed., L. Davis 1968). 
 101. Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A 
Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152, 152–153 (1996). 
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disclosure took place in about the same time that it took courts to hear 
Canterbury and issue an opinion in the case.102 
The reality is that courts may be unsuited to addressing policy 
problems in a rapidly changing profession like medicine because of the 
length of time it takes to resolve cases. Crafting legal measures to 
combat paternalism when it is already a breach of the standard of care to 
fail to disclose is a belt and suspender approach where such redundancy 
is unnecessary. At worst, such behavior on the part of courts risks 
unconsidered and unintended consequences. 
2. The Objective Reasonable Patient Standard Is Tainted by 
Irremediable Hindsight Bias.  Hindsight bias is the inclination to see events 
that have occurred as more predictable than they were before they took 
place; it has a high probability of affecting the outcome of qualitative 
jury decisions like those in duty to disclose cases.103 The Canterbury court 
employed the objective, reasonable patient standard because it was in 
concert with the usual negligence doctrine and, the court reasoned, the 
liability for failure to disclose should be in foresight, not hindsight.104 
However, no case explains how a jury is to fairly decide and combat its 
unavoidable hindsight bias about what a reasonable patient at the time 
of the disclosure would have wanted to know, given that an adverse 
outcome is known and an unrevealed risk has come to pass. Although 
various solutions for combating hindsight bias have been proposed, 
none has proved successful. In fact, once a person is put into the position 
of vulnerability to hindsight bias, no effective remedial response has 
been found.105 
3. Negative Behavioral Responses to Imposing the Duty to Disclose 
Based on the Facts of Marsingill I.  There are several possible behavioral 
responses of physicians to the rule of Marsingill I on the duty to disclose. 
First, some physicians will, as the court decision requires, speculate on a 
 
 102. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777. More than 13 years elapsed between 
Canterbury’s surgery and Judge Robinson’s decision in the case. Id. 
 103. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration 
That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patient Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 
1403 (2006) (citing Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski and Cynthia Fobian Wilham, 
The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 147, 150–51 (1991) (giving a meta-analysis of over 120 hindsight bias 
studies)). 
 104. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. 
 105. See Mandel, supra note 103, at 1402–03 (citing David A. Schkade & Lynda 
M. Kilbourne, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 108 (1991) (noting that 
once an outcome is known it becomes difficult to accurately reconstruct a 
previous state of mind). 
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diagnosis based on the information provided by the patient regardless 
of its adequacy. This will likely be confusing and perhaps even 
misleading to patients. For example, the symptoms reported by Vicki 
Marsingill—abdominal pain and distention, nausea, and inability to 
burp or defecate—are not exclusive to intestinal obstruction. The 
Internet health information site WebMD Symptom Checker identifies at 
least 20 other conditions, both minor and serious, that share those 
symptoms and that a physician would have to consider and reveal if 
material to the patient’s decision about what to do.106 Dr. O’Malley 
himself, as well as at least one of his experts, posed several additional 
conditions as relevant diagnostic considerations.107 
Considering the number of potentially material facts to reveal, it is 
likely that physicians could only give speculative, summary advice such 
as “it could be very serious, it might be relatively trivial, and because I 
can’t tell over the telephone, you should come in for an evaluation.” 
How an answer like this is an improvement over the advice that was 
given, with respect to patient autonomy, the court leaves unexplained. 
The material information the patient needs is that an evaluation is 
necessary; exactly what Dr. O’Malley told Marsingill. The fact that two 
civil juries found for Dr. O’Malley—under the reasonably prudent 
physician standard in the first trial108 and under the reasonable patient 
standard in the second trial109—supports the conclusion that telling the 
patient she needed an evaluation was sufficient material information. 
Undoubtedly, some physicians will continue to respond as Dr. 
O’Malley did: they will candidly relay that they are not in a position to 
draw diagnostic conclusions and suggest an evaluation. Although the 
juries in Marsingill found for Dr. O’Malley on the duty to disclose, there 
 
 106. Web MD, Symptom Checker, http://symptoms.webmd.com/symptom 
checker (last visited May 7, 2007). Vicki Marsingill’s symptoms: abdominal pain 
and distention, nausea, and inability to burp or defecate were entered into the 
program “Symptom Checker” along with some additional factors from the case 
history. A 46 year-old female patient with Marsingill’s symptoms could have, as 
revealed in order of appearance by Symptom Checker: constipation, gas pains, 
gastroenteritis, diverticulitis, intestinal ileus, irritable bowel syndrome, intestinal 
obstruction, general and post-surgical adhesions, endometriosis, muscle strain, 
food poisoning, gallstones, giardiasis, helicobacter pylori infection, narcotic 
abuse, polycystic kidney disease, porphyria, indigestion, Budd-Chiari 
syndrome, and panic attack. Additional past medical history not presented in 
the court record may have allowed exclusion of some of these diagnostic 
considerations. 
 107. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 46, at 14; see also Marsingill I, 58 P.3d 495, 499 
(Alaska 2002). Other considerations included pancreatitis, acute ulcer, and 
slipped Nissen-fundoplication. Id. 
 108. Marsingill I, 58 P.3d at 497, 505. 
 109. Marsingill II, 128 P.3d 151, 155 (Alaska 2006). 
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is no assurance that other juries will do so under similar facts. 
Speculatively, the Marsingill juries recognized that physicians must have 
an opportunity to evaluate a patient prior to providing medical care, 
that the general risks and benefits of obtaining or refusing medical care 
or evaluation are well within the realm of the common knowledge of a 
reasonable patient. The jury presumably also recognized that those 
general risks and benefits required no disclosure beyond stating the 
obvious: “Without an opportunity to evaluate, I can’t recommend a 
course of treatment.” Since there is no assurance that all juries will 
respond as the Marsingill juries did in finding for Dr. O’Malley, these 
physicians are simply assuming the added liability the court has 
imposed. 
Finally, other physicians have not been so sanguine in their 
response to Marsingill. After the decision in Marsingill I, considerable 
concern within the medical community prompted a change in 
physicians’ practices.110 Some physicians simply declined to answer 
their patients’ calls after hours, typically by having a phone message or 
answering service directing patients to go to the ER where an evaluation 
by the ER physician would precede any contact with the patient’s 
primary physician.111 The consequences of this change include 
substantial patient inconvenience, a general increase in the cost of care 
as a result of ER evaluation, and depersonalization of the delivery of 
health care. Where a rule imposes inconvenience and expense on all 
patients in an attempt to preserve an additional claim for an occasional 
patient, the rule becomes controversial. This is particularly so when 
there is already a mechanism in place, namely the negligence action that 
views the duty to disclose under an ordinarily prudent physician 
standard. When the professional standard to provide full disclosure to 
patients about their diseases, prognosis, and prospective treatments, 
affords a cause of action, imposing a more expensive theoretical 
rationale questioned by empirical studies is problematic and unjustified. 
 
 
 110. Tanya Albert, Alaska Physician Wins Case on Ignored Medical Advice, AM. 
MED. NEWS, June 7, 2004, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews 
/2004/06/07/gvsc0607.htm (last visited May 18, 2007) (discussing results of the 
second trial in Marsingill and the effect of extension of the duty to disclose on a 
physician’s call-taking and ER referrals); Telephone Interview with James 
Jordan, Executive Director, Alaska State Medical Association (May 18, 2007) 
[hereinafter Jordan Interview]; Telephone Interview with Howard Lazar, 
Defense Counsel for Dr. O’Malley (May 19, 2007) [hereinafter Lazar Interview]. 
 111. Albert, supra note 110; Jordan Interview, supra note 110; Lazar Interview, 
supra note 110. 
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IV. INFORMED CONSENT IN ALASKA POST-MARSINGILL 
Only two cases have cited Marsingill about informed consent.112 In 
Roukounakis v. Messer,113 a case addressing whether an informed consent 
claim properly accompanies a failure to diagnose claim, the Court of 
Appeals of Massachusetts cites Marsingill as the only court, to date, to 
hold that the duty to disclose a condition may arise prior to a physician’s 
awareness of the diagnosis.114 
In the second, Harrold v. Artwohl,115 the Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed a trial court grant of summary judgment for the defendant, Dr. 
Artwohl, on an informed consent claim because there were issues of 
material fact not considered by the trial court in granting summary 
judgment.116 The court merely reiterated the holding of Korman that 
adequacy of disclosure was to be judged under the reasonable patient 
standard.117 
With the support of the Alaska State Medical Association, Dr. 
O’Malley sought without success in 2004 to change section 09.50.556 of 
the Alaska Statutes to specifically “clarify the law of informed consent in 
medical malpractice cases” and “modify” the common law decisions of 
Korman and Marsingill.118 
 
 
 112. A third case cited Marsingill I for an issue unrelated to informed consent. 
Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1012 n.97 (Alaska 2005) (discussing the 
closing argument of the defense attorney in Marsingill I about defendant’s ability 
to pay a judgment if one were rendered in favor of the plaintiff). 
 113. 826 N.E.2d 777 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 781 (citing Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 956 n.2 (Wash. 
1999) (recognizing that under Washington’s informed consent statute, section 
7.70.050 of the Revised Code of Washington, a physician should not be 
additionally liable for a condition “unknown” to him); see also Bays v. St. Lukes 
Hospital, 825 P.2d 319, 322 (Wash Ct. App. 1992) (holding that duty to disclose 
does not arise until the physician becomes aware of the condition by diagnosing 
it). 
 115. 132 P.3d 276 (Alaska 2006). 
 116. Harrold v. Artwohl, 132 P.3d at 277. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See H.B. 0472, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/me23/query=*/doc/%7Bt2069%7D? 
(last visited May 18, 2007). The primary changes proposed sought to excuse from 
liability any practitioner who by telephone or other electronic communication 
gave advice that the patient seek further care at a health care facility and the 
patient elected not to follow that advice, and to reinstate a professional standard 
for determining the scope of disclosure. See id. In the next session the Alaska 
State Medical Association sought to concentrate its efforts on achieving other 
tort reform measures and the changes sought in H.B. 0472 were not 
reintroduced. 
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CONCLUSION 
Other courts to date have declined to venture where the Alaska 
Supreme Court chose to go in its extension of the duty to disclose in 
Marsingill. Whether courts in states with similar statutory schemes and 
common law jurisprudence will identify AMA Section 8.08 as a source 
of law and the origin of a duty to disclose and see fit to impose the duty 
to disclose on physicians who have had no opportunity to exercise their 
professional expertise, remains open to speculation. Absent a legislative 
solution, physicians have only unsatisfactory choices. Turn off the 
phone, inconvenience your patients, and contribute to the rising cost of 
healthcare, or assume the risk and trust in the good sense of juries to 
understand what judges apparently cannot: that without an evaluation, 
a physician cannot divine all the material risks that a patient needs to 
know. 
 
